Why America Can't Produce Enough Weapons for a Major War

The United States military, despite having the world's largest defense budget, faces a shocking reality: it cannot produce enough conventional weapons to sustain a major, prolonged conflict. This industrial shortfall isn't just a logistical challenge—it's a strategic vulnerability that threatens America's ability to deter adversaries and support allies. The workers on the factory floors understand this crisis better than anyone, as they struggle with outdated facilities, workforce shortages, and production bottlenecks that have been decades in the making.

The Stark Reality of America's Weapons Shortage

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed dangerous gaps in U.S. military stockpiles. Ukraine consumes artillery shells at rates Pentagon planners couldn't have imagined just a few years ago. A single Ukrainian battery can fire more 155mm rounds in a day than some American units used in months during the Iraq War. Meanwhile, Israel's sophisticated air defense networks devour interceptor missiles by the dozen during each Iranian strike, each costing millions of dollars and taking months to replace.

The numbers tell a sobering story. America currently produces roughly 40,000 artillery shells per month—a rate that represents a 178 percent increase from pre-war levels, yet still falls short of Ukrainian consumption alone. The Army's goal of reaching 100,000 shells monthly by mid-2026 sounds impressive until one considers that Ukraine's forces can fire that quantity in a matter of weeks during intensive operations. War games demonstrate that the United States would deplete essential munitions within just eight days of engaging in a high-intensity conflict with China over Taiwan.

Why Defense Contractors Can't Ramp Up Production

The problem stems from conflicting priorities between national security needs and corporate profitability. Defense contractors like Lockheed Martin face two mandates that directly oppose each other: dramatically increase missile output to meet urgent Pentagon demands while maintaining high profit margins to satisfy Wall Street investors. To significantly boost production, companies would need to invest billions in supply chains and workforce expansion—investments that would cut into free cash flow and potentially hurt stock prices.

In 2023, Lockheed Martin earned $6.9 billion in profit with $6.2 billion in free cash flow. Rather than investing heavily in production capacity, the company returned $9.2 billion directly to shareholders through stock buybacks and dividends—more than three times what it spent on research and capital investment. During 2024, shareholders received another $6.8 billion while factory workers struggled with lean manufacturing demands and stagnant wages.

The Worker Strikes That Exposed the System

In May 2025, workers at Lockheed Martin's Orlando missile factory went on strike after the company offered only 3-4 percent annual raises despite years of high inflation. The union asked for 12-18 percent in the first year to compensate for eroded purchasing power. After three weeks on the picket line, workers received only marginal improvements—highlighting how even critical defense workers lack the leverage to demand fair compensation while shareholders continue receiving billions.

These labor tensions aren't isolated incidents. They represent a fundamental conflict in the U.S. defense industrial base: companies are asked to treat weapons production as a strategic national priority while operating under financial structures that prioritize quarterly earnings and shareholder returns above surge capacity and workforce retention.

The Pentagon's Long-Term Strategic Failures

America's weapons shortage didn't happen overnight. It's the result of four decades of policy decisions that systematically dismantled the industrial base that won World War II and sustained the Cold War. Since the 1980s, the U.S. defense establishment has made calculated bets that future wars would be brief, high-tech affairs decided by precision strikes rather than sustained artillery barrages.

The Reagan administration ended subsidies for commercial shipbuilding, leading to a collapse in America's shipbuilding capacity. Base closures eliminated too many maintenance facilities, creating backlogs that now leave 37 percent of the Navy's attack submarine force unavailable for service. The 1990s saw massive contractor consolidation—51 major aerospace firms became just five companies, reducing competition and eliminating surge capacity.

China's Industrial Advantage

While America struggles to produce 40,000 artillery shells monthly, China has built the world's largest manufacturing base capable of outproducing the U.S. in virtually every category of conventional weapons. China now controls nearly 50 percent of the global commercial shipbuilding market with 20 large shipyards that can produce both naval and commercial vessels. U.S. commercial shipbuilding, by contrast, accounts for roughly one-tenth of one percent of that market.

Russia, with a GDP less than one-tenth that of the U.S. and EU combined, produces nearly three times the number of artillery rounds as America and Europe collectively manufacture. This disparity reveals a harsh truth: technological superiority cannot compensate for inadequate production capacity in wars of attrition.

The Path Forward: What Needs to Change

Addressing America's weapons production crisis requires both immediate action and long-term structural reforms. Congress has approved $6 billion to expand shell production and modernize factories, while the Army is investing $742 million to increase HIMARS rocket launcher production. But these efforts only scratch the surface of what's needed.

The Pentagon must break up defense contractor oligopolies to restore competition, rebuild in-house technical expertise, and establish multi-year contracts that give companies confidence to invest in production capacity. The Defense Department also needs to streamline qualification processes, increase prototyping, and rebuild the National Defense Stockpile that was systematically sold off during the 1990s budget fights.

Most fundamentally, America must abandon the assumption that wars can be won quickly through technological dominance alone. History repeatedly demonstrates that in prolonged conflicts, the side that can sustain higher rates of production and fire ultimately prevails. As one World War II poem captured it: "For every shell Krupp fired, General Motors sent back four." America needs to rebuild that industrial capacity before the next major conflict puts it to the test.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long would U.S. munitions last in a war with China?

War games conducted by defense analysts demonstrate that the United States would deplete essential munitions within just eight days of engaging in a high-intensity conflict with China over Taiwan. Current production rates cannot sustain the consumption levels required for major conventional warfare against a peer adversary.

Why can't the U.S. produce more artillery shells?

The U.S. produces artillery shells at a single complex in Scranton and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, that's more than a century old. A new facility in Mesquite, Texas is under construction but won't be operational for years. The Pentagon also traditionally awarded only one-year contracts for munitions, which discouraged companies from investing in expanded capacity. Lead times for increasing production are measured in years, not months.

How much do defense contractors spend on shareholders versus production?

In 2023, Lockheed Martin returned $9.2 billion to shareholders through stock buybacks and dividends—more than three times the $3 billion it spent on research and capital investment. In 2024, shareholders received another $6.8 billion. This pattern of prioritizing shareholder returns over production capacity investment is common across major defense contractors.

What happened to America's World War II production capacity?

The Arsenal of Democracy that produced 18,482 B-24 bombers during World War II has been systematically dismantled since the 1980s. The iconic Willow Run plant was demolished in 2010. Decades of base closures, contractor consolidation, elimination of commercial shipbuilding subsidies, and focus on low-volume high-tech weapons have left America unable to surge production when needed.

The Bottom Line

America's inability to produce sufficient weapons for sustained conflict represents one of the most serious strategic vulnerabilities facing U.S. national security. The workers who manufacture missiles, shells, and other critical munitions understand this crisis intimately—they see the aging facilities, the workforce shortages, and the production constraints that no amount of Pentagon spending can quickly overcome. Fixing this problem requires not just more funding, but a fundamental reconceptualization of what military readiness means in an era of great-power competition. The nation that once built a B-24 bomber every hour must rediscover its industrial capacity before that weakness becomes catastrophic.